The de- regulation of the global sports talent ( and labor) market
Among the various impacts of the post-Bosman deregulation of the global sports talent market is a rapid increase in the number of players migrating from Eastern Europe, South America, Africa and Asia to the European football leagues, in particular the five major leagues. Frick ( 2009) has shown that the playing time of “local players” (non-immigrants) has decreased, but this has not improved the competitive balance, neither for the importing championships, nor for the exporting championships. The deregulation of the labor market has indeed accelerated the international mobility of players but has not, as the liberal economists (in favor of deregulation) expected, more balanced the sporting forces present in the various leagues. This is in line with economic analyzes (Andreff 2001, 2004 & 2010d) which have highlighted an impact of the Bosman judgment , for sports clubs unable to afford European superstars, which consists in offering a substitute element, much less expensive than the purchase of stars , namely the importation of players from developing countries, preferably minors of 18 years , destined to become, after a few months or years in the team, star players. This phenomenon is widely documented by a report from the Italian Senate for Lega Calcio clubs , by the Donzel report ( 1999) for French football and more generally by Tshimanga Bakadiababu (2001 ) . This resulted in an acceleration of the "brain drain" (by analogy with the brain drain) of footballers from developing countries to European football championships .
Most of these players transferred from developing countries, especially from Africa , did not sign an employment contract when they left their country, their family, their friends, without any source of income or financial assistance. The market for players under 18 was quickly connotations of "slave market" of "child trafficking" and "trafficking in persons sniffed ns " . D are legal actions were initiated e s by young African players who , having been tested without result, and therefore without being committed pa r professional clubs, have been totally abandoned to themselves , both by clubs and players' agents. Being minors, without a work contract and without a plane ticket paid in advance for the return to their country of origin , they had become de facto immigrant workers in an illegal situation . In addition, this exodus of muscle s away abroad the most talented athletes, that is to say, the tiny minority who had the chance to benefit coaches and sports facilities available during 're in their developing countries of origin. It strongly undermines the ability of these countries to make the best use of their talented footballers in international competitions .
After the European Union will be moved to the persistence of this situation, u do new regulation football players transfer was adopted by FIFA and entered into force on 1 st September 2001. E lle contains such clauses having tr is the protection of minors and forbid a nt transfer internationa l of players under 18 years. The regulation of FIFA 2001 is a step forward in the bonn e di rection (Gerrard, 2002). But the transfer 's now illegal to players 18 miners continue Aftern s 2001, a sign that the FIFA rules are circumvented by some s professional clubs, players' agents and family s player s. Under FIFA regulations, all transfers under the age of 18 are prohibited from all regions of the world outside the EU; they therefore do not generate a single cent of income for the original developing country. On the other hand, the FIFA rules completely block (if strictly enforced and controlled) the market mechanism and reduce the mobility of minor players from outside the EU to exactly zero. Like any absolute ban, the FIFA rules have created a (worldwide) black market for underage players. FIFA has more recently envisioned a return to a quota of foreign players aligned by competing clubs (the so-called 6 + 5 rule, including 6 national players), supposed to reduce the problems of competitive imbalance and to limit mobility a little. international players and its effects. Undoubtedly, if adopted, such a rule would be invalidated by the Bosman jurisprudence.
Another solution, inspired by the Tobin tax to curb the art movements capitau x short-term on the global financial markets, could be to adopt the principle of a tax Coubertobin - detailed in Andreff ( 2004). The idea is to levy a tax at the rate of 1% on all transfer bonuses and first salaries stipulated in the employment contracts signed by players from developing countries with professional clubs and / or agents of foreign players . The crucial problem of the transfer of s players below 18 years would be taken into account through the addition of a surcharge for transfers below 18 years, the rate of increase as the player's age on the date of transfer would be increasingly under 18. I s this is not a panacea. U no such regulation, if adopted internationally (for now it lacks the political will), would pose serious implementation problems, but not essential. Interest in this kind of tax has increased since the start of the general financial crisis and with the financial crisis in European football . UEFA, very concerned about the transfers of minor players , seems to have inquired about the principle of such regulation.
The outcome of international transfers of athletes is sometimes - little in football - a request for naturalization of the emigrated athlete. Temporary or permanent emigration of athletes creating a request for a change of nationality is unidirectional (with rare exceptions) with mobility from less developed countries and towards developed countries. D Sc when it is paid athletes who live their sport performance, motivation of the athlete is often access, stabilize or increase its financial gains by requesting naturalization. Sporting nationality thus tends to be transformed into a financial asset .
From the point of view of the host country of the naturalized athlete, there is an advantage in recruiting a high performing athlete in their national selection (Qatar), but the recruitment of foreign athletes can lessen (or destroy) the training effort of young local players. It is often more expensive to train a player than to buy him abroad (Husting, 2004), at least if we buy him in a developing country. The destination club is generally in favor of the adoption of the nationality of the host country by the immigrant athlete. This avoids counting it among foreigners when a rule limits their number on the ground. At the level of the host country and the “nursery” club for young sports talents who will emigrate, there is a partly negative impact. The financial compensation received rarely covers the training and training costs of the athlete in the case of home clubs located in developing countries. Ultimately, the idea of organized ation of the Games or championships m wave national teams would be threatened if more countries adopt a strategy for recruiting their athletes similar to that of sports clubs , and this by means of naturalization .
Besides the Coubertobin tax, there are few regulations that could prevent the naturalization of athletes for the time being. It could extend to other sports rules nationality change like this girls US Soccer l l, basketball and cycling . For FIFA, any footballer selected for a national team can no longer be selected for another national team even if he has in the meantime acquired another nationality . FIBA has a similar rule by limiting to a player who has acquired nationality (after 16 years) the maximum allowed of naturalized in each national team. The International Cycling Federation makes it impossible to change sports nationality . One could imagine a withholding tax on salaries and bonuses received during the year , levied by the relevant national sports federation of the host country and transferred to that of the country of origin, as soon as the athlete obtains a selection in the national team of the host country, and this for all the years in which it is selected (to slow down the naturalization of “mercenaries” in sport, selling to the most offering countries).
Conclusion
The ways in which the economic globalization of sport operates tends to unbalance a number of sports competitions, particularly in football. These imbalances in turn maintain a concentration of income that is not conducive to a return to competitive equilibrium. A reflection on additional regulations is necessary, even urgent, in the face of the crisis in European football produced both by the insufficiency of certain rules and by the deregulation of the sports talent market which has led to its globalization.
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1
[1] Professor emeritus at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Honorary President of the International Association of Sport Economists .
[2] Economic analysis distinguishes (Szymanski, 2001; Forrest et al. , 2005 ; Buraimo & Simmons, 2008) the supporters who come to support their favorite team and see the result - preferably the victory of 'their' team - and spectators who come to the stadium as we go to other shows in the hope of witnessing a quality performance, the preference of which is for suspenseful competitions (therefore balanced) involving a sporting issue regardless of the winner. Most of the viewers belong to the second category.
[3] The main ingredients of which are, in addition to the "glorious uncertainty of sport", the format of the competition, the organization of the sporting event, its competitive balance, the sporting stake, the number deployed, the score achieved , the aesthetics of the technical gesture and the schedule.
[4] We focus here on examples of team sports mainly, the regulation of individual sports events necessarily referring to the mathematical theory of tournaments, the complexity of which cannot fit in this chapter.
[5] With three exceptions: intra-EU transfers, cross-border players and international mobility of the player's family for a reason unrelated to football.
[6] In which the players keep swapping their positions during the match and where an Italian defense ( catenacio ), a German-style ethic of hard work and self-sacrifice and a game of repeated passing combine Dutch style.
[7] The Olympic medals are normally counted, according to the IOC, by athlete. The habit was acquired over time, and especially during the Cold War, of counting it by nations and classifying them according to their number of medals .
[8] This Commission was created in 1999 following the scandal (corruption of an IOC member) of the award of the Winter Games to Salt Lake City.
[9] Other 2010 WC semi-finalist prediction drills performed by Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and UBS banks also found two out of four semi-finalists because of the "surprises" created by Brazil's early elimination. and Italy and the qualification of Uruguay in the semi-finals.
[10] A strong correlation was observed between the budget of the sports ministry and the number of medals won at the Beijing Olympics in the 27 EU countries (Andreff, 2010c); it would be interesting to carry out a similar calculation between the budgets of national football federations and the results of national teams at WC 2010.
[11] The naturalizations of athletes also affect the composition of the national teams participating in the Olympic Games, are a problem for the IOC and will undoubtedly call for regulation in the long term (limitation of the number of naturalized people or other). At the Athens Olympics, there were 29 naturalized in the French team, 28 in the Greece team, 16 for Israel, 13 for the United States and Australia, 12 for Germany, etc. (Andreff, 2005) .
[12] Its TV audience provides it with income enabling UEFA to split between the participating clubs € 416 million in 2004-05, € 586 million in 2007-08 and € 583 million in 2009-10 .
[13] Equal distribution between the participants of 25% of the television income under solidarity, 25% of the income being distributed according to the sports results during the competition and 50% distributed according to the TV audience rates of each club during this one. These rules concentrate the financial gains from the Champions League on the clubs which go the furthest in the competition and on those which have a strong media audience whatever their results (Manchester United, Real Madrid, AC Milan, etc.).
[14] In Ligue 1, revenues from the Champions League represent, depending on the year, between 7 and 10% of all revenues in the French league, but these revenues have been concentrated on 5 clubs.
[15] Szymanski (2001) also does not find a clear relationship between winning percentage (equivalent to ranking rank) and attendance in English football.
[16] The Journal of Sports Economics devoted its issue 7 (1), 2006 and part of 8 (6), 2007 to this financial crisis.
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