Regulation by changing sports rules: an example

Regulation by changing sports rules: an example

The tendency to develop a game rained s defensive in football, resulting in an increase in proport ion low games s score s, 0-0 and 1-0 (Alavy et al ., 2010 ; Andreff & Raballand 2010). The ratio between the number of these matches and those with a high score (4 goals or more per match) is growing in the major leagues of European football, except the Bundesliga , this phenomenon being particularly accentuated in French Ligue 1, which has the best competitive equilibrium index. As a result, the average of goals scored in football leagues tends to drop. In addition, an increasing fraction of goals are t labeled e from set shots s, ie on dice referee decisions - 30% e n Ligue 1 in 2006-07, the same percentage as the goals marked s in the Cup of the World of Football 1998. The article by Alavy et al. tests that 0-0 draws attract fewer viewers than 1-0 Premier League scores . Andreff & Raballand demonstrate that the percentage of scores 0-0 and 1-0 are extremely significant variables to explain the competitive balance and the ranking of the teams; but it influences the attractiveness of the competition for spectators, the lower-attendance Ligue 1 has the lowest scores, the highest-attendance league, the Bundesliga , has the fewest low scores. The number of goals scored is an important factor in the quality of matches to attract spectators, a dimension neglected in the Besson report (2008) on the competitiveness of French clubs .

This proportion of low scores is somewhat surprising since FIFA , from the 1995-96 season, modified the sporting rule rewarding a victory of 2 to 3 points per game won. The objectives of this regulation were to increase the number of goals per match, to have fewer draws and more interesting and attractive matches. The rise in low scores indicates that this regulation has not been sufficient or effective enough. Other tests have shown that this change in sporting rule has pushed up the number of draws (Aylott & Aylott, 2007), decrease the number of 0-0 so insignificant ( Dilger & Geyer, 2009), reduced the number Average goals scored s ( Amann, Dewenter & Namini, 2004) and the average number of offensive actions ( Hundsdoerf st, 2004). Garicano & Palacios-Huerta (2006) tested that the 3-point rule reduced the number of games with at least two goals difference, increased the number of goals scored from set pieces and the number of goals won by a single goal, and the number of yellow cards and the incentive to foul play ( unfair ) reducing interest spectateu rs. A theoretical explanation , using game theory , of the counter- productivity of the 3- point win rule is provided in Brocas & Carrillo ( 2004 ).

The debate is therefore open as to other rules that can stimulate the number of goals scored and the attractiveness of football. Thus it is suggested in Andreff & Raballand (2010) to consider reducing promotion-relegation to a single club in Ligue 1, to abandon the offside rule outside the penalty area, to introduce exclusion of the player after a foul (as in rugby and ice hockey ) and, above all, to change the reward for sports performances as follows: 3 points per win, 1 point per draw, ½ point per draw 0- 0 and 0 points per loss.